• 1: The Program of Record (Constrained Budget)
• 2: ISS Focused (Constrained Budget)
• 3: The Program of Record (Increased Budget)
• 4A: ISS Focused (Increased Budget)
• 4B: ISS/Shuttle Extension
• 5A: Flexible Path (Ares V “Light”)
• 5B: Flexible Path (Commercial HLV)
• 5C: Flexible Path (Shuttle Derived)

Here’s the final score, including numbers from both the August 12 and October 8 meetings. The meaning of each score is described in the evaluation criteria document.

References

• “Transcript: Public Meeting“. Review of US Human Space Flight Plans Committee. 12 August 2009.
• “Summary Report“. Review of US Human Space Flight Plans Committee. 8 September 2009.
• “Scoring Update“. Review of US Human Space Flight Plans Committee. 8 October 2009.

Related posts:

1. Future of NASA: Analysis
2. Future of NASA: Deep Space (Shuttle Derived)
3. Future of NASA: The Program of Record

Ares I is part of a proposed system of two launch vehicles designed to carry humans to the Moon. It evolved from the Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) described in the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS). CLV was intended to serve two purposes. One, it was to carry the Orion spacecraft, then known as the CEV, to orbit where it would rendezvous with other components of the Earth-Moon stack. The other was to service the International Space Station (ISS). Other architectures were considered, including a dual launch of two man-rated heavy-lift vehicles (HLVs). However, one of the advantages of separating the CLV from the HLV was that the CLV could be fielded early enough to support the ISS. When this architecture was chosen, the CLV was to begin operations in 2011. It would run “taxi service” to the ISS until the HLV became available, at which point tests for the Moon mission would begin.

The CLV design selected by ESAS has other positive aspects. The study estimated that the loss of crew (LOC) risk would be roughly 1 every 2000 flights, far better than Space Shuttle demonstrated LOC. However, according to Augustine panel member Jeff Greason, “PRAs grossly overstate the reliability of an as-yet unflown system”, meaning that the CLV LOC number does not include unpredictable factors such as human error or design error. The CLV was also based on direct Shuttle-heritage hardware, including a four segment solid rocket booster (SRB) and a Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME). This would significantly reduce development cost and risk.

The CLV eventually became Ares I. Its development would be lead by NASA, in the interest of accelerating the schedule and of reconstituting NASA’s rocket design capability. This capability had been lost in the decades after Space Shuttle development was completed. In the United States, the only organizations with orbital rocket design teams at that point were United Launch Alliance (ULA), Orbital Sciences, and SpaceX. Several changes were made to the CLV design. The CLV second stage needed an air-start capability, meaning that ignition had to be initiated by the second stage and not by ground control. Modifying SSME to be both air-startable and disposable was quickly determined to be a much larger project than NASA was willing to undertake. It was replaced by the J-2X, an engine of Saturn V heritage and shared with the Ares V. J-2X underperformance compared to SSME necessitated that the second stage be shortened and the first stage be upgraded from a four segment SRB to five segments. Due to these changes and more detailed work estimates, the initial operating capability (IOC) date was moved from 2011 to 2014. Ares I would still service ISS for 1-2 years, but a “gap” appeared in NASA’s ability to launch astronauts from Shuttle retirement in 2010 until Ares I IOC in 2014. Ares I’s ability to support the ISS was still considered to be viable, due to the high likelihood that Congress would not allow ISS to be terminated in 2016, even though the projected budget did not include an extension.

Work began on Ares I with the previously mentioned changes, while Ares I-X went on a separate path. Instead of flight-testing the Ares I first stage, Ares I-X would test the four segment SRB specified for the CLV. This would still validate that a rocket with a Space Shuttle SRB for a first stage could launch successfully. Ares I-X has remained on-schedule for its first flight in 2009. The United States Air Force, responsible for range safety at Cape Canaveral, has raised a concern that vibration caused by SRB thrust oscillation will cause failures in the Ares I-X avionics. The test launch is currently scheduled for the end of October.

The Ares I development schedule is much longer than Ares I-X. Starting in 2005, it was projected to take roughly six years to complete. Changes in 2006 from CLV to Ares I raised that to eight years. The schedule was extended a year by NASA in 2007. The Aerospace Corporation performed an independent schedule assessment in 2009 and determined that the remaining development work would take seven years to complete. In the three years from 2006 to 2009, Ares I has closed on its schedule end date by one year. The Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee found that Ares I no longer supports the ISS, because, even with an optimistic budget projection, ISS will have to be de-orbited before Ares I IOC. This restriction is due to schedule pressure caused by operating Ares I while developing Ares V. Removing one of the two major rationales for developing Ares I illustrates why a review of the Constellation program is needed at this time.

About $8 billion dollars has been invested in Ares I development as of 2009. The project has passed two major hardware milestones: the successful tests of the abort system and the test firing of the five segment SRB. A test flight of Ares I-X seems imminent, as these things go. Some technical problems threaten the development of an operating vehicle. Ares I’s payload capacity is insufficient to launch the Orion space capsule as originally designed. This has necessitated several redesigns of Orion, and may result in future delays to both Ares I and Orion. Vibration due to thrust oscillation continues to threaten both passengers and avionics. The five segment SRB test may have retired some of the risk, but thrust oscillation severity in Shuttle SRBs has historically varied widely. These problems, plus some others, were estimated by the review panel to be solvable given enough time and money.

The main proponent of the Program of Record is former NASA Administrator Michael Griffin. In his testimony to Congress, he charged that the review panel “double-counted” the schedule reserve for Ares I development, unnecessarily extending it from 2015 to 2016. Also, in his opinion, ISS funding should be decoupled from Constellation development. This would allow Ares I to service ISS during the years 2015-2020. In Griffin’s estimation, this would cost NASA roughly $15 billion above the review panel’s unconstrained projection. Griffin also notes that a dual Ares V mission would cost hundreds of millions more per mission than the Ares I + Ares V approach.

Given enough funding, Griffin’s approach could work well. Ares I has certainly retired some technical and schedule risk in three years of development. For $45 billion above the president’s budget projection, NASA could simultaneously operate two launch vehicles, service the ISS, and accomplish its Moon mission. However, a plus $45 billion budget was investigated neither by the review panel nor by Congress. Compared against other plus $30 billion options, continuing to build Ares I means the end of ISS in 2016.

Canceling Ares I does not imply that $8 billion has gone down the drain. Ares development to date has produced several benefits which may prove useful to the exploration program. First, the recently tested five segment SRB would be used in the Ares V Light design, though not in other Shuttle-derived designs. Second, Ares I development will have been a valuable learning experience for NASA and served to reconstitute a NASA orbital rocket design team. Third, it has started work on the J-2X rocket engine, which will inform future rocket designs. Fourth, the Ares I-X test will give Kennedy Space Center practice launching rockets which are not Space Shuttles.

In conclusion, choosing to continue development on Ares I is a question of the value placed on other aspects of the exploration program. The primary loss in the Program of Record is the ISS. Alternative programs would not only extend its time on orbit, they would increase utilization and improve its return on investment. Another loss is the potential for NASA to jump-start a commercial crew launch service. The other loss in the Program of Record is the technology development program. Avoiding technology development for the next two decades means that NASA cannot hope to increase the pace or duration of exploration missions, or to extend those missions beyond the Moon. If the value placed on these aspects is minimal, Ares I in the enhanced budget Program of Record is viable and appears to expose the exploration program to less development risk than the other options.

References

• “Launch Vehicles and Earth Departure Stages“. Exploration Systems Architecture Study. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. November 2005.
• “Multi-Program Integrated Milestones“. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Q3 2008.
• “Vibration Analysis Delays Ares I-X Stacking“. Aviation Week. July 6, 2009.
• “Summary Report“. Review of US Human Space Flight Plans Committee. September 8, 2009.
• “ Mike Griffin Lashes Out at The Augustine Committee via Email“. SpaceRef.com. September 10, 2009.

Related posts:

1. Ares V Light
2. Future of NASA: Deep Space (Ares V "Light")
3. Future of NASA: Analysis

Mr. President:

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to write to you concerning the Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee. I was very impressed by the public meetings and the documents released by the committee. Their deliberations have been thoughtful and thorough, and they produced a compelling set of options for future human space exploration. While investigating the different options, they found that NASA’s current architecture for returning to Moon is pointless and counterproductive. I fully agree with this finding. We can do better, even on a limited budget, by following one of their alternative architectures which includes commercial crew transportation to the International Space Station and a technology development program. By taking their advice, we can reduce the cost of access to space and improve our capabilities to conduct future missions beyond Earth orbit. Finally, I am excited by the discussion about the Deep Space architecture, with its missions to the asteroids and Mars. I hope that we can find some room in the budget to send humans further out into space than they ever have been before, and return them safely to the Earth. Thank you very much for your time.

Matt Wronkiewicz
Ventura, CA

With a claimed rate of 10,000 messages received per day, you might wonder what the point is of sending a message to the President. I see two reasons for doing this. One is to at least balance out the arguments for space district job retention and for diverting the human space exploration budget to more local concerns. The other is to increase the visibility of outer space issues in the Administration. Essentially, the “open government” initiative boils down to a giant write-in poll. If that poll gauges no interest in human spaceflight, the administration will conclude that shutting it down would have no effect on his approval rating.

To take the next step and contact the President, either write a letter or make a call. When writing, address the president, but keep in mind that your letter will be “read” by an overworked staff member. That staff member’s job is to enter your contact information in their database, digest your letter as quickly as possible, and then pigeonhole you into some category. The category you want to be pigeonholed in is “supportive of human spaceflight and of the Augustine commission’s recommendations”, and, if at all possible, “not a nut case”. My advice for communicating effectively to a disinterested political staffer:

• Be polite
• Be brief
• Don’t get technical
• Use key words, first letter of each capitalized if possible
• Say what interests you about the topic
• Represent yourself, not an organization or company
• Be unique, or at least don’t submit my letter as your own

So, that’s it. If you do take my advice, make a note of it in the comment form below. Please mention if, upon reading your letter, President Obama flew out to have lunch with you. I hope to provide additional opportunities for influencing the future course of human spaceflight over the next couple of weeks. Also, keep an eye on Ferris Valyn’s diary. He’s covering the same ground I’m going over, from a more partisan perspective. I plan to steal all his ideas.

No related posts.

• The Program of Record
• ISS Focused (Constrained Budget)
• ISS Focused (Increased Budget)
• ISS/Shuttle Extension
• Deep Space (Ares V “Light”)
• Deep Space (Commercial HLV)
• Deep Space (Shuttle Derived)

We have an opportunity here to directly affect the future course of humans in outer space. The committee has provided the President with a discrete set of options, backed by ten very well regarded people and the best available data and budget projections. Not only that, these architectures are the most honest assessment of NASA’s ability to conduct manned space exploration to date. Most previous studies of this scale had been conducted behind closed doors, and many made the incorrect assumption that NASA could make do with any level of funding, or projected wildly optimistic funding levels. I found their honest assessment rather troubling. In the best case, NASA will be stuck in LEO for at least another decade. Astronauts won’t walk on the surface of another planet for 15 years or more. Given that none of the presented options are a slam-dunk for human expansion into the Solar System, which of them should we support? Does one of them merit a focused push for Presidential support? Right here, I am going to try to answer that question.

Ground rules and assumptions

Let me start by saying that I believe the point of manned space exploration is the expansion of human civilization into space. If you’re in it for science or national prestige, then this essay is not for you. As I argued in my letter to the Augustine Committee, civilization follows commerce, and commerce requires some sort of profit-making engine. Two potentially profitable enterprises beyond low-Earth orbit are energy production and resource extraction. Both of these can be done on the Moon or among the asteroids. Asteroids are much easier to reach and return from because of their low gravity. Because of this, I think the they should be our near-term destination, with the Moon a close second. Another aspect of civilization is that it is made of a diverse group of individually motivated people. A team of NASA astronauts following orders from mission control does not constitute civilization.

I will be making a few assumptions about the future of politics and of NASA. One is that the future never pans out the way we planned. Funding gets cut or diverted to pet programs, technical problems come up, people aren’t as competent as they say they are, and paper rockets always look better than real rockets. This becomes more of a problem the further into the future you go. For this reason, I will be ignoring completely any projections beyond 2030, heavily discounting projections beyond 2025, and taking anything past 2020 with a large grain of salt. The really important parts will happen in the next five years. I am also going to assume that NASA has designed its last HLV, the Space Shuttle. NASA has not been able to demonstrate the successful launch of a new orbital system in over twenty years. Along the way, many of its attempts have failed, and this has strained their credibility to a breaking point. Their most recent project, the Ares I, was an essential step toward regaining their credibility, and they failed, not because of funding, but because they made fundamental design mistakes and forgot to account for operations costs. If NASA can’t develop a medium lift launch vehicle, how are they going to build a heavy lifter from the ground up? They can’t, at least not without excessive amounts of money and the latitude to fail a few times before getting it right. They have two ways out of this. One is that they can outsource the rocket development to teams with more experience. Another is that they can adapt what they have into a new system. Both of these approaches have risks of their own, of course.

I’ll say a few words about Mars before moving on. Many people whose opinions I respect think that Mars should be the goal of human spaceflight. There are some good reasons for this. Mars offers the most benign environment off the Earth that we know of. Mars settlements may also provide some protection from Earth-wide catastrophies. However, Mars is unattainable at this time, for the reasons given by the committee. It’s also at the bottom of a deep gravity well that cuts it off from any space-based economy and makes a return to Earth risky at best. Mars will play into our future in space, but I think the committee rightly discarded the Mars First option as unworkable. Of the alternative architectures, the Deep Space options do the most to prepare us for eventual expeditions to the surface of Mars, and I will keep that in mind in my analysis.

Strategy

Given that the important milestones for all these alternative architectures lie beyond the horizon of predictability, how can we assess them? I do think we should support an architecture that directs us along the path of human expansion into the Solar System, even if it certainly will not pan out the way we want. However, we should consider above other factors NASA’s activities over the next five years.

Some big questions remain about public commitment to space exploration, funding availability, and NASA’s attitude toward American industry. The answer to these questions will have an affect on our strategy, so we will have to be flexible, adapting to new information as it comes along. For example, if an extra $3 billion per year for manned exploration is impossible, we should not throw our weight behind an architecture that requires it. If NASA is going to take that $3 billion and use it to crush its competition, then we should not support the extra funding. If NASA is going to take the extra money and use it to encourage the space industry, then we should ask for it. Probably the only information we will have in a timely fashion is an assessment of public support. If public opinion seems to gravitate towards an architecture that serves the interest of human expansion into space, we should change our strategy to take advantage of it. Another big question is how the President, Congress, and the public will react to the idea of massive layoffs and facilities closures at NASA. It’ll happen sooner or later, the question is if we have the stomach to do it all right now.

Putting all that together, I’ll be looking for an architecture that front-loads the milestones, supports the space industry to the maximum extent possible, does not require the development of an all-new HLV, and puts NASA on a path to human expeditions to the Moon and asteroids. Let’s see what we’ve got.

The options

The Program of Record

This plan essentially makes no changes to the current architecture. NASA continues on with Ares I, finishes it after the ISS is retired, and then starts on Ares V. If they continue to support Ares I after Ares V becomes operational, their entire exploration budget will be devoted to supporting these two launch vehicles, with nothing left over for expeditions beyond LEO. On the plus side, it fits within the budget and it gives NASA an opportunity to prove itself with Ares I. On the down side, investment in technology and support for private industry is minimal, there’s no chance of expeditions beyond LEO, and its launch systems will compete with private launchers. This architecture is pointless and counterproductive.

ISS Focused (constrained funding)

This plan supports an extension of ISS, a commercial crew service to LEO, and a technology development program. It also cancels Ares I and all beyond-LEO exploration systems. NASA will continue on with Ares V, which they will fail to deliver. It fits within the projected budget and it supports private industry. Its technology development program may make future exploration architectures easier. Private space transportation may support private space stations and the beginnings of a service economy in LEO. Even though it is presented by the committee only as a point of reference, I think this might be a viable alternative to the current architecture if additional funding for NASA seems unlikely.

ISS Focused (increased funding)

This plan supports an extension of ISS, a commercial crew service to LEO, a technology development program, and an exploration program that looks a lot like the current architecture. Ares I is cancelled. NASA will continue on with Ares V, which they will fail to deliver. It supports private industry, though not to the maximum extent possible. Its technology development program may make future exploration missions easier. Private space transportation may support private space stations and the beginnings of a service economy in LEO. It’s a lot of money to spend for no additional benefit. If extra funding is available, I think we have better options.

ISS/Shuttle Extension

This plan supports an extension of ISS, a commercial crew service to LEO, and a technology development program. It removes the requirement to purchase Soyuz flights and contains exploration elements similar to the current architecture. Ares I is cancelled. NASA will begin development of a Shuttle-derived HLV (SDLV), which it may be able to deliver. It supports private industry, though not to the maximum extent possible. It may potentially lead to lunar expeditions. This plan has a lot in common with Deep Space (Shuttle Derived), but it trades the asteroid missions for less reliance on Soyuz space capsules. I think that’s a dangerous trade at a 2% risk of loss of crew per Shuttle flight. Also, asteroid missions are worth the effort.

Deep Space (Ares V “light”)

There’s almost nothing to like about this architecture. All the exploration milestones come too late to be meaningful, it requires additional funding, and it requires the development of a new HLV. We’re better off spending less for ISS Focused, but it’s better than the Program of Record.

Deep Space (commercial HLV)

This is an interesting but risky alternative. It supports an ISS extension, commercial crew to LEO, technology development, commercial HLV, propellant depots, and human exploration beyond LEO. If that all sounds too good to be true, it probably is. Private industry doesn’t have a need right now for the kind of heavy lift this would require, and it does need extra funding. Also, it requires massive layoffs and facilities closures at NASA, which would happen over the next five years. I’ll wait and see on this one. If they can make it fit the budget and we see some momentum for a new way of doing business at NASA, then it might be worth supporting. Otherwise I don’t see it going far.

Deep Space (Shuttle derived)

This architecture supports an ISS extension, commercial crew to LEO, technology development, and human exploration beyond LEO. NASA may be able to deliver a SDLV, which would enable missions to the Moon and asteroids in a disappointing but reasonable timeframe. Of the options that require an additional investment, this provides the biggest return at a low risk. If $3 billion a year seems possible, this is the option we should support.

Conclusions and next steps

Of the alternative architectures proposed, three stand out as attractive options: ISS Focused (constrained funding), Deep Space (commercial HLV), and Deep Space (SDLV). With the final report in hand and more information about the political climate, these can be whittled down to one best option. If more funding is available, Deep Space with SDLV is the way to go. If Deep Space with commercial HLV fits the budget and the climate is right, it might be the best option. Otherwise, I’ll be supporting ISS Focused and waiting for private industry to take over for NASA.

I’m planning to send a message to President Obama urging him to follow the committee’s recommendations. That includes $3 billion more per year for NASA, not to be used to compete with private industry. It also includes commercial crew transportation to ISS and the technology development that we need from NASA to take the next steps in space. Supporting all the recommended architectures is much easier than supporting three, because political staffers in general have little patience for the technical detail that separates the different architectures, and the administration is likely to pick and choose pieces of the recommended architectures anyway. I’ll also be sending an email to the Office of Science and Technology Policy at info@ostp.gov, expressing my support for the committee’s findings. If your representative is a Democrat, now would be a good time to request that they send a letter to President Obama in support of the alternate architectures.

After I get more information about which option is the most supportable, I’ll be ready to focus on one architecture. I will also be keeping an eye out for the Next Step in Space Coalition or another group to organize a trip to Washington to present these arguments in person.

All in all, I think the committee did a really fantastic job with the constraints they were given. Christopher Chyba, Sally Ride, Jeff Greason, and Ed Crawley in particular made this committee a landmark achievement in human spaceflight by exposing the tendency of NASA to over-promise and under-fund, and pointing a new way forward. We will do well to carry on their work as far as we can.

Related posts:

1. Future of NASA: Deep Space (Shuttle Derived)
2. Future of NASA: The Program of Record
3. Future of NASA: Deep Space (Ares V "Light")

The Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee has drawn up several alternate architectures for NASA to pursue its mission of sending astronauts beyond low Earth orbit (LEO). For a more complete summary, see “Future of NASA: Program of Record“. The seventh architecture in the list is focused on exploration missions to deep space using a Shuttle-derived heavy-lift launch vehicle (SDLV), assuming an increased budget of $3 billion per year.

2010

The first commercial cargo deliveries to the International Space Station (ISS) begin.

2011

In March, the Space Shuttle is retired after delivering all the currently planned components to ISS. Soyuz space capsules, provided by international partners, provide crew transportation to ISS for the next five years.

2016

In June, a commercial crew transportation service to ISS becomes operational. Utilization of ISS for R&D increases.

2020

ISS is retired in January. The budget provides funding for a propulsion module which will bring ISS to a controlled re-entry. Some of it will burn up in the atmosphere, the rest will be disposed of in the ocean.

2022

A Shuttle-Derived Heavy-Lift (SDLV) launcher becomes operational, carrying cargo only. Crews are shuttled to orbit on commercial rockets.

2023

Orion/Earth departure stage (EDS) expedition to a Lagrange point in free space.

2027

Orion/EDS expedition to rendezvous with a near-Earth object (NEO). Astronauts explore the asteroid’s surface and extract samples before returning to Earth.

2029

Orion/EDS expedition to fly by Mars. No descent to the surface or rendezvous with a Martian moon is attempted.

2030

Humans land on the Moon using a commercially developed lander and return to Earth.

References

• “Integrated Options for Human Exploration Discussion“. Review of US Human Space Flight Plans Committee. 12 August 2009.
• Ride, Sally; Crawley, Ed; Greason, Jeff; Behmuk, Bo. “Scenario Affordability Analysis“. Review of US Human Space Flight Plans Committee. 12 August 2009.

More in this series:

• The Program of Record
• ISS Focused (Constrained Budget)
• ISS Focused (Increased Budget)
• ISS/Shuttle Extension
• Deep Space (Ares V “Light”)
• Deep Space (Commercial HLV)
• Deep Space (Shuttle Derived)

Related posts:

1. Future of NASA: Deep Space (Ares V "Light")
2. Future of NASA: Deep Space (Commercial HLV)
3. Future of NASA: ISS/Shuttle Extension