Ares I is part of a proposed system of two launch vehicles designed to carry humans to the Moon. It evolved from the Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) described in the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS). CLV was intended to serve two purposes. One, it was to carry the Orion spacecraft, then known as the CEV, to orbit where it would rendezvous with other components of the Earth-Moon stack. The other was to service the International Space Station (ISS). Other architectures were considered, including a dual launch of two man-rated heavy-lift vehicles (HLVs). However, one of the advantages of separating the CLV from the HLV was that the CLV could be fielded early enough to support the ISS. When this architecture was chosen, the CLV was to begin operations in 2011. It would run “taxi service” to the ISS until the HLV became available, at which point tests for the Moon mission would begin.

The CLV design selected by ESAS has other positive aspects. The study estimated that the loss of crew (LOC) risk would be roughly 1 every 2000 flights, far better than Space Shuttle demonstrated LOC. However, according to Augustine panel member Jeff Greason, “PRAs grossly overstate the reliability of an as-yet unflown system”, meaning that the CLV LOC number does not include unpredictable factors such as human error or design error. The CLV was also based on direct Shuttle-heritage hardware, including a four segment solid rocket booster (SRB) and a Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME). This would significantly reduce development cost and risk.

The CLV eventually became Ares I. Its development would be lead by NASA, in the interest of accelerating the schedule and of reconstituting NASA’s rocket design capability. This capability had been lost in the decades after Space Shuttle development was completed. In the United States, the only organizations with orbital rocket design teams at that point were United Launch Alliance (ULA), Orbital Sciences, and SpaceX. Several changes were made to the CLV design. The CLV second stage needed an air-start capability, meaning that ignition had to be initiated by the second stage and not by ground control. Modifying SSME to be both air-startable and disposable was quickly determined to be a much larger project than NASA was willing to undertake. It was replaced by the J-2X, an engine of Saturn V heritage and shared with the Ares V. J-2X underperformance compared to SSME necessitated that the second stage be shortened and the first stage be upgraded from a four segment SRB to five segments. Due to these changes and more detailed work estimates, the initial operating capability (IOC) date was moved from 2011 to 2014. Ares I would still service ISS for 1-2 years, but a “gap” appeared in NASA’s ability to launch astronauts from Shuttle retirement in 2010 until Ares I IOC in 2014. Ares I’s ability to support the ISS was still considered to be viable, due to the high likelihood that Congress would not allow ISS to be terminated in 2016, even though the projected budget did not include an extension.

Work began on Ares I with the previously mentioned changes, while Ares I-X went on a separate path. Instead of flight-testing the Ares I first stage, Ares I-X would test the four segment SRB specified for the CLV. This would still validate that a rocket with a Space Shuttle SRB for a first stage could launch successfully. Ares I-X has remained on-schedule for its first flight in 2009. The United States Air Force, responsible for range safety at Cape Canaveral, has raised a concern that vibration caused by SRB thrust oscillation will cause failures in the Ares I-X avionics. The test launch is currently scheduled for the end of October.

The Ares I development schedule is much longer than Ares I-X. Starting in 2005, it was projected to take roughly six years to complete. Changes in 2006 from CLV to Ares I raised that to eight years. The schedule was extended a year by NASA in 2007. The Aerospace Corporation performed an independent schedule assessment in 2009 and determined that the remaining development work would take seven years to complete. In the three years from 2006 to 2009, Ares I has closed on its schedule end date by one year. The Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee found that Ares I no longer supports the ISS, because, even with an optimistic budget projection, ISS will have to be de-orbited before Ares I IOC. This restriction is due to schedule pressure caused by operating Ares I while developing Ares V. Removing one of the two major rationales for developing Ares I illustrates why a review of the Constellation program is needed at this time.

About $8 billion dollars has been invested in Ares I development as of 2009. The project has passed two major hardware milestones: the successful tests of the abort system and the test firing of the five segment SRB. A test flight of Ares I-X seems imminent, as these things go. Some technical problems threaten the development of an operating vehicle. Ares I’s payload capacity is insufficient to launch the Orion space capsule as originally designed. This has necessitated several redesigns of Orion, and may result in future delays to both Ares I and Orion. Vibration due to thrust oscillation continues to threaten both passengers and avionics. The five segment SRB test may have retired some of the risk, but thrust oscillation severity in Shuttle SRBs has historically varied widely. These problems, plus some others, were estimated by the review panel to be solvable given enough time and money.

The main proponent of the Program of Record is former NASA Administrator Michael Griffin. In his testimony to Congress, he charged that the review panel “double-counted” the schedule reserve for Ares I development, unnecessarily extending it from 2015 to 2016. Also, in his opinion, ISS funding should be decoupled from Constellation development. This would allow Ares I to service ISS during the years 2015-2020. In Griffin’s estimation, this would cost NASA roughly $15 billion above the review panel’s unconstrained projection. Griffin also notes that a dual Ares V mission would cost hundreds of millions more per mission than the Ares I + Ares V approach.

Given enough funding, Griffin’s approach could work well. Ares I has certainly retired some technical and schedule risk in three years of development. For $45 billion above the president’s budget projection, NASA could simultaneously operate two launch vehicles, service the ISS, and accomplish its Moon mission. However, a plus $45 billion budget was investigated neither by the review panel nor by Congress. Compared against other plus $30 billion options, continuing to build Ares I means the end of ISS in 2016.

Canceling Ares I does not imply that $8 billion has gone down the drain. Ares development to date has produced several benefits which may prove useful to the exploration program. First, the recently tested five segment SRB would be used in the Ares V Light design, though not in other Shuttle-derived designs. Second, Ares I development will have been a valuable learning experience for NASA and served to reconstitute a NASA orbital rocket design team. Third, it has started work on the J-2X rocket engine, which will inform future rocket designs. Fourth, the Ares I-X test will give Kennedy Space Center practice launching rockets which are not Space Shuttles.

In conclusion, choosing to continue development on Ares I is a question of the value placed on other aspects of the exploration program. The primary loss in the Program of Record is the ISS. Alternative programs would not only extend its time on orbit, they would increase utilization and improve its return on investment. Another loss is the potential for NASA to jump-start a commercial crew launch service. The other loss in the Program of Record is the technology development program. Avoiding technology development for the next two decades means that NASA cannot hope to increase the pace or duration of exploration missions, or to extend those missions beyond the Moon. If the value placed on these aspects is minimal, Ares I in the enhanced budget Program of Record is viable and appears to expose the exploration program to less development risk than the other options.

References

• “Launch Vehicles and Earth Departure Stages“. Exploration Systems Architecture Study. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. November 2005.
• “Multi-Program Integrated Milestones“. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Q3 2008.
• “Vibration Analysis Delays Ares I-X Stacking“. Aviation Week. July 6, 2009.
• “Summary Report“. Review of US Human Space Flight Plans Committee. September 8, 2009.
• “ Mike Griffin Lashes Out at The Augustine Committee via Email“. SpaceRef.com. September 10, 2009.

Related posts:

1. Ares V Light
2. Future of NASA: Deep Space (Ares V "Light")
3. Future of NASA: Analysis

Mr. President:

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to write to you concerning the Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee. I was very impressed by the public meetings and the documents released by the committee. Their deliberations have been thoughtful and thorough, and they produced a compelling set of options for future human space exploration. While investigating the different options, they found that NASA’s current architecture for returning to Moon is pointless and counterproductive. I fully agree with this finding. We can do better, even on a limited budget, by following one of their alternative architectures which includes commercial crew transportation to the International Space Station and a technology development program. By taking their advice, we can reduce the cost of access to space and improve our capabilities to conduct future missions beyond Earth orbit. Finally, I am excited by the discussion about the Deep Space architecture, with its missions to the asteroids and Mars. I hope that we can find some room in the budget to send humans further out into space than they ever have been before, and return them safely to the Earth. Thank you very much for your time.

Matt Wronkiewicz
Ventura, CA

With a claimed rate of 10,000 messages received per day, you might wonder what the point is of sending a message to the President. I see two reasons for doing this. One is to at least balance out the arguments for space district job retention and for diverting the human space exploration budget to more local concerns. The other is to increase the visibility of outer space issues in the Administration. Essentially, the “open government” initiative boils down to a giant write-in poll. If that poll gauges no interest in human spaceflight, the administration will conclude that shutting it down would have no effect on his approval rating.

To take the next step and contact the President, either write a letter or make a call. When writing, address the president, but keep in mind that your letter will be “read” by an overworked staff member. That staff member’s job is to enter your contact information in their database, digest your letter as quickly as possible, and then pigeonhole you into some category. The category you want to be pigeonholed in is “supportive of human spaceflight and of the Augustine commission’s recommendations”, and, if at all possible, “not a nut case”. My advice for communicating effectively to a disinterested political staffer:

• Be polite
• Be brief
• Don’t get technical
• Use key words, first letter of each capitalized if possible
• Say what interests you about the topic
• Represent yourself, not an organization or company
• Be unique, or at least don’t submit my letter as your own

So, that’s it. If you do take my advice, make a note of it in the comment form below. Please mention if, upon reading your letter, President Obama flew out to have lunch with you. I hope to provide additional opportunities for influencing the future course of human spaceflight over the next couple of weeks. Also, keep an eye on Ferris Valyn’s diary. He’s covering the same ground I’m going over, from a more partisan perspective. I plan to steal all his ideas.

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My name is Matt Wronkiewicz. I am a computer programmer with little involvement in the space industry, but I am excited about both the possibility of visiting outer space some day and the potential benefits from its economic development. I was first introduced to the idea that we could extract the resources of space for our benefit by Dr. John Lewis of Arizona University. He argued that not only are the asteroids an extremely valuable resource in the Solar System, they are also easier to reach than the surfaces of the terrestrial planets. It is for those reasons that I find the Exploration Beyond LEO Subcommittee’s Deep Space option particularly compelling. Out of all the options presented, this one has the best chance of providing an economic incentive to expand our civilization out into the Solar System. As committee member Dr. Christopher Chyba remarked, “if that is not the point of human space flight, then what the hell are we doing?”

Considering the amount of money invested in NASA to date, I am surprised by how little progress has been made in opening up this frontier. If the Space Shuttle is retired and the ISS de-orbited in the next five years, we will be left with essentially no foothold in space. Due to decades of short-sighted decision making and an inefficient and inflexible NASA workforce, our massive investment in human spaceflight has been squandered. Multiple attempts by NASA to move beyond the Shuttle have ended in failure. It is now too late to finish a new transportation system before the current one is retired. NASA suffers from credibility as well as technical challenges, and these combined will form an insurmountable barrier to sending humans beyond LEO. We have an alternative to repeating the same mistakes again. We can turn transportation to LEO over to the private sector. Only when transportation is directed by economics and not politics will our space efforts be sustainable. Once these capabilities are proven, NASA’s mission will even become affordable.

When humans do leave Earth orbit again, their first priority should be to leave something behind to make the next mission easier. The committee has detailed several ways we could accomplish this, such as building outposts, cycling habitats, and propellant depots. Of these, the most achievable given current technology is the propellant depot. Depots in Earth orbit and beyond will not only reduce the cost of NASA missions, they will enable our economy to expand into the Solar System through trade and ISRU. As our economy expands, civilization will follow as a matter of course. For these reasons, propellant depots should not only be an enabler or enhancer for deep space missions, they should be a goal.

Thank you for accepting my comments. I am truly excited and encouraged by the work the committee has done to date.

Sincerely,

Matthew J. Wronkiewicz

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