Ares V Light is a simplification of the Ares V design, which itself is a derivation of the Cargo Launch Vehicle (CaLV) described in the 2005 Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) report. ESAS considered several combinations of existing hardware and extensions to that hardware that were considered low-risk. CaLV comprised a Space Shuttle External Tank (ET)-sized core powered by five Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs) and two five-segment Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs). The SSMEs would be thrown away on every flight. CaLV would send about 55 metric tons (mT) to a trans-lunar injection (TLI).

Ares V Light and Ares V differ outwardly only in the number of segments in each SRB

CaLV eventually was refined into the Ares V design. Ares V was modified in several ways from the CaLV in order to increase payload and reduce per-flight cost. In particular it uses expendable RS-68B engines derived from the Delta IV, and it extended the SRBs to 5.5 segments. The payload capacity of Ares V is an impressive 159 mT to LEO and 71 mT to TLI. With these upgrades, Ares V deviates significantly from the Ares I components that it was intended to share. Also, it requires the development of a new SRB design and a new LOX/LH2 engine variant.

Ares V Light is closer to the original CaLV design in that it maintains the original 5 segment SRB. Another difference is that it trades the advanced RS-68B for the RS-68A, which is nearing operational capability on the Delta IV. Payload capacity is reduced to 143 mT. This limits it to sending the Orion space capsule to the Moon or the Altair lander, but not both at the same time. Thus, a mission to the lunar surface would require two launches of Ares V Light instead of one Ares I and one Ares V. An additional crew launch aboard a commercial vehicle may be required for this mission if Ares V Light is not man-rated.

Ares V Light has several advantages over the baseline Ares I + Ares V configuration. Primarily, it requires the development and operation of a single NASA-owned rocket instead of two. The committee found that operating both Ares I and Ares V at the projected budget levels would consume NASA’s entire exploration budget, leaving nothing for expeditions beyond LEO. Also, Ares V Light would require less development work. The five segment SRB has been successfully tested, as have the RS-68A engines. The downsides are that it would have less lift capacity in a single launch, and that it would render moot some of the development work that has gone into Ares I. Ares V Light development is projected to finish in the early 2020s. After the Space Shuttle is retired, NASA would have no in-house space launch vehicles for more than a decade. This would extend the “gap” during which NASA would be unable to fly its astronauts by about five years over the baseline case. However, this could be mitigated by encouraging the development of commercial alternative crew launch, which the committee estimates would be ready by 2016.

The Ares V Light configuration first appeared in Bo Bejmuk’s July 29 presentation of the LEO Access subcommittee. Information about this configuration seems to have come from NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), as Ares V Integration Manager Steve Creech referred to it in his presentation that day. Ares V Light was included in three of the seven architectures retained after the August 12 meeting, and those options were carried forward in the final report. The summary stated “of these two Ares system alternatives, the Committee finds the Ares V Lite in the dual mode the preferred reference option.”

References

• “Launch Vehicles and Earth Departure Stages“. Exploration Systems Architecture Study. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. November 2005.
• Bejmuk, Bo. “LEO Access Subgroup“. Review of US Human Space Flight Plans Committee. 29 July 2009.
• “Transcript: Constellation Architecture, Part 6b“. Review of US Human Space Flight Plans Committee. 29 July 2009.
• “Integrated Options for Human Exploration Discussion“. Review of US Human Space Flight Plans Committee. 12 August 2009.
• “Summary Report“. Review of US Human Space Flight Plans Committee. 8 September 2009.

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• The Program of Record
• ISS Focused (Constrained Budget)
• ISS Focused (Increased Budget)
• ISS/Shuttle Extension
• Deep Space (Ares V “Light”)
• Deep Space (Commercial HLV)
• Deep Space (Shuttle Derived)

We have an opportunity here to directly affect the future course of humans in outer space. The committee has provided the President with a discrete set of options, backed by ten very well regarded people and the best available data and budget projections. Not only that, these architectures are the most honest assessment of NASA’s ability to conduct manned space exploration to date. Most previous studies of this scale had been conducted behind closed doors, and many made the incorrect assumption that NASA could make do with any level of funding, or projected wildly optimistic funding levels. I found their honest assessment rather troubling. In the best case, NASA will be stuck in LEO for at least another decade. Astronauts won’t walk on the surface of another planet for 15 years or more. Given that none of the presented options are a slam-dunk for human expansion into the Solar System, which of them should we support? Does one of them merit a focused push for Presidential support? Right here, I am going to try to answer that question.

Ground rules and assumptions

Let me start by saying that I believe the point of manned space exploration is the expansion of human civilization into space. If you’re in it for science or national prestige, then this essay is not for you. As I argued in my letter to the Augustine Committee, civilization follows commerce, and commerce requires some sort of profit-making engine. Two potentially profitable enterprises beyond low-Earth orbit are energy production and resource extraction. Both of these can be done on the Moon or among the asteroids. Asteroids are much easier to reach and return from because of their low gravity. Because of this, I think the they should be our near-term destination, with the Moon a close second. Another aspect of civilization is that it is made of a diverse group of individually motivated people. A team of NASA astronauts following orders from mission control does not constitute civilization.

I will be making a few assumptions about the future of politics and of NASA. One is that the future never pans out the way we planned. Funding gets cut or diverted to pet programs, technical problems come up, people aren’t as competent as they say they are, and paper rockets always look better than real rockets. This becomes more of a problem the further into the future you go. For this reason, I will be ignoring completely any projections beyond 2030, heavily discounting projections beyond 2025, and taking anything past 2020 with a large grain of salt. The really important parts will happen in the next five years. I am also going to assume that NASA has designed its last HLV, the Space Shuttle. NASA has not been able to demonstrate the successful launch of a new orbital system in over twenty years. Along the way, many of its attempts have failed, and this has strained their credibility to a breaking point. Their most recent project, the Ares I, was an essential step toward regaining their credibility, and they failed, not because of funding, but because they made fundamental design mistakes and forgot to account for operations costs. If NASA can’t develop a medium lift launch vehicle, how are they going to build a heavy lifter from the ground up? They can’t, at least not without excessive amounts of money and the latitude to fail a few times before getting it right. They have two ways out of this. One is that they can outsource the rocket development to teams with more experience. Another is that they can adapt what they have into a new system. Both of these approaches have risks of their own, of course.

I’ll say a few words about Mars before moving on. Many people whose opinions I respect think that Mars should be the goal of human spaceflight. There are some good reasons for this. Mars offers the most benign environment off the Earth that we know of. Mars settlements may also provide some protection from Earth-wide catastrophies. However, Mars is unattainable at this time, for the reasons given by the committee. It’s also at the bottom of a deep gravity well that cuts it off from any space-based economy and makes a return to Earth risky at best. Mars will play into our future in space, but I think the committee rightly discarded the Mars First option as unworkable. Of the alternative architectures, the Deep Space options do the most to prepare us for eventual expeditions to the surface of Mars, and I will keep that in mind in my analysis.

Strategy

Given that the important milestones for all these alternative architectures lie beyond the horizon of predictability, how can we assess them? I do think we should support an architecture that directs us along the path of human expansion into the Solar System, even if it certainly will not pan out the way we want. However, we should consider above other factors NASA’s activities over the next five years.

Some big questions remain about public commitment to space exploration, funding availability, and NASA’s attitude toward American industry. The answer to these questions will have an affect on our strategy, so we will have to be flexible, adapting to new information as it comes along. For example, if an extra $3 billion per year for manned exploration is impossible, we should not throw our weight behind an architecture that requires it. If NASA is going to take that $3 billion and use it to crush its competition, then we should not support the extra funding. If NASA is going to take the extra money and use it to encourage the space industry, then we should ask for it. Probably the only information we will have in a timely fashion is an assessment of public support. If public opinion seems to gravitate towards an architecture that serves the interest of human expansion into space, we should change our strategy to take advantage of it. Another big question is how the President, Congress, and the public will react to the idea of massive layoffs and facilities closures at NASA. It’ll happen sooner or later, the question is if we have the stomach to do it all right now.

Putting all that together, I’ll be looking for an architecture that front-loads the milestones, supports the space industry to the maximum extent possible, does not require the development of an all-new HLV, and puts NASA on a path to human expeditions to the Moon and asteroids. Let’s see what we’ve got.

The options

The Program of Record

This plan essentially makes no changes to the current architecture. NASA continues on with Ares I, finishes it after the ISS is retired, and then starts on Ares V. If they continue to support Ares I after Ares V becomes operational, their entire exploration budget will be devoted to supporting these two launch vehicles, with nothing left over for expeditions beyond LEO. On the plus side, it fits within the budget and it gives NASA an opportunity to prove itself with Ares I. On the down side, investment in technology and support for private industry is minimal, there’s no chance of expeditions beyond LEO, and its launch systems will compete with private launchers. This architecture is pointless and counterproductive.

ISS Focused (constrained funding)

This plan supports an extension of ISS, a commercial crew service to LEO, and a technology development program. It also cancels Ares I and all beyond-LEO exploration systems. NASA will continue on with Ares V, which they will fail to deliver. It fits within the projected budget and it supports private industry. Its technology development program may make future exploration architectures easier. Private space transportation may support private space stations and the beginnings of a service economy in LEO. Even though it is presented by the committee only as a point of reference, I think this might be a viable alternative to the current architecture if additional funding for NASA seems unlikely.

ISS Focused (increased funding)

This plan supports an extension of ISS, a commercial crew service to LEO, a technology development program, and an exploration program that looks a lot like the current architecture. Ares I is cancelled. NASA will continue on with Ares V, which they will fail to deliver. It supports private industry, though not to the maximum extent possible. Its technology development program may make future exploration missions easier. Private space transportation may support private space stations and the beginnings of a service economy in LEO. It’s a lot of money to spend for no additional benefit. If extra funding is available, I think we have better options.

ISS/Shuttle Extension

This plan supports an extension of ISS, a commercial crew service to LEO, and a technology development program. It removes the requirement to purchase Soyuz flights and contains exploration elements similar to the current architecture. Ares I is cancelled. NASA will begin development of a Shuttle-derived HLV (SDLV), which it may be able to deliver. It supports private industry, though not to the maximum extent possible. It may potentially lead to lunar expeditions. This plan has a lot in common with Deep Space (Shuttle Derived), but it trades the asteroid missions for less reliance on Soyuz space capsules. I think that’s a dangerous trade at a 2% risk of loss of crew per Shuttle flight. Also, asteroid missions are worth the effort.

Deep Space (Ares V “light”)

There’s almost nothing to like about this architecture. All the exploration milestones come too late to be meaningful, it requires additional funding, and it requires the development of a new HLV. We’re better off spending less for ISS Focused, but it’s better than the Program of Record.

Deep Space (commercial HLV)

This is an interesting but risky alternative. It supports an ISS extension, commercial crew to LEO, technology development, commercial HLV, propellant depots, and human exploration beyond LEO. If that all sounds too good to be true, it probably is. Private industry doesn’t have a need right now for the kind of heavy lift this would require, and it does need extra funding. Also, it requires massive layoffs and facilities closures at NASA, which would happen over the next five years. I’ll wait and see on this one. If they can make it fit the budget and we see some momentum for a new way of doing business at NASA, then it might be worth supporting. Otherwise I don’t see it going far.

Deep Space (Shuttle derived)

This architecture supports an ISS extension, commercial crew to LEO, technology development, and human exploration beyond LEO. NASA may be able to deliver a SDLV, which would enable missions to the Moon and asteroids in a disappointing but reasonable timeframe. Of the options that require an additional investment, this provides the biggest return at a low risk. If $3 billion a year seems possible, this is the option we should support.

Conclusions and next steps

Of the alternative architectures proposed, three stand out as attractive options: ISS Focused (constrained funding), Deep Space (commercial HLV), and Deep Space (SDLV). With the final report in hand and more information about the political climate, these can be whittled down to one best option. If more funding is available, Deep Space with SDLV is the way to go. If Deep Space with commercial HLV fits the budget and the climate is right, it might be the best option. Otherwise, I’ll be supporting ISS Focused and waiting for private industry to take over for NASA.

I’m planning to send a message to President Obama urging him to follow the committee’s recommendations. That includes $3 billion more per year for NASA, not to be used to compete with private industry. It also includes commercial crew transportation to ISS and the technology development that we need from NASA to take the next steps in space. Supporting all the recommended architectures is much easier than supporting three, because political staffers in general have little patience for the technical detail that separates the different architectures, and the administration is likely to pick and choose pieces of the recommended architectures anyway. I’ll also be sending an email to the Office of Science and Technology Policy at info@ostp.gov, expressing my support for the committee’s findings. If your representative is a Democrat, now would be a good time to request that they send a letter to President Obama in support of the alternate architectures.

After I get more information about which option is the most supportable, I’ll be ready to focus on one architecture. I will also be keeping an eye out for the Next Step in Space Coalition or another group to organize a trip to Washington to present these arguments in person.

All in all, I think the committee did a really fantastic job with the constraints they were given. Christopher Chyba, Sally Ride, Jeff Greason, and Ed Crawley in particular made this committee a landmark achievement in human spaceflight by exposing the tendency of NASA to over-promise and under-fund, and pointing a new way forward. We will do well to carry on their work as far as we can.

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The Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee has drawn up several alternate architectures for NASA to pursue its mission of sending astronauts beyond low Earth orbit (LEO). For a more complete summary, see “Future of NASA: Program of Record“. The seventh architecture in the list is focused on exploration missions to deep space using a Shuttle-derived heavy-lift launch vehicle (SDLV), assuming an increased budget of $3 billion per year.

2010

The first commercial cargo deliveries to the International Space Station (ISS) begin.

2011

In March, the Space Shuttle is retired after delivering all the currently planned components to ISS. Soyuz space capsules, provided by international partners, provide crew transportation to ISS for the next five years.

2016

In June, a commercial crew transportation service to ISS becomes operational. Utilization of ISS for R&D increases.

2020

ISS is retired in January. The budget provides funding for a propulsion module which will bring ISS to a controlled re-entry. Some of it will burn up in the atmosphere, the rest will be disposed of in the ocean.

2022

A Shuttle-Derived Heavy-Lift (SDLV) launcher becomes operational, carrying cargo only. Crews are shuttled to orbit on commercial rockets.

2023

Orion/Earth departure stage (EDS) expedition to a Lagrange point in free space.

2027

Orion/EDS expedition to rendezvous with a near-Earth object (NEO). Astronauts explore the asteroid’s surface and extract samples before returning to Earth.

2029

Orion/EDS expedition to fly by Mars. No descent to the surface or rendezvous with a Martian moon is attempted.

2030

Humans land on the Moon using a commercially developed lander and return to Earth.

References

• “Integrated Options for Human Exploration Discussion“. Review of US Human Space Flight Plans Committee. 12 August 2009.
• Ride, Sally; Crawley, Ed; Greason, Jeff; Behmuk, Bo. “Scenario Affordability Analysis“. Review of US Human Space Flight Plans Committee. 12 August 2009.

More in this series:

• The Program of Record
• ISS Focused (Constrained Budget)
• ISS Focused (Increased Budget)
• ISS/Shuttle Extension
• Deep Space (Ares V “Light”)
• Deep Space (Commercial HLV)
• Deep Space (Shuttle Derived)

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• 2: Program of Record (POR), adjusted for risk, constrained to the FY10 budget (for reference only, not executable)
• 3B: ISS focused, commercial crew, constrained to the FY10 budget (for reference only, no exploration program)
• 3B$: ISS focused, commercial crew, “plus up” budget
• 5$: Lunar sorties, shuttle derived, “plus up” budget
• 6$: Deep space, dual Ares V light, “plus up” budget
• 7$: Deep space, commercial HLV, “plus up” budget
• 7S$: Deep space, shuttle derived, “plus up” budget

I’ll attempt to boil down the differences in this table:

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